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The	cycle	continues:	The	endurance	of	majoritarian
politics	in	Sri	Lanka
When	analysing	the	results	of	Sri	Lanka’s	parliamentary	elections	on	Wednesday,	5	August,	Dharsha
Jegatheeswaran	(Adayaalam	Centre	for	Policy	Research,	Jaffna,	Sri	Lanka	and	LSE	alumnus)	argues	that	the	role
of	Sinhala	Buddhist	nationalism	cannot	be	overstated.
Last	week	parliamentary	elections	in	Sri	Lanka	firmly	ushered	in	an	era	of	authoritarianism,	as	the	Sri	Lankan
Podujana	Peramuna	(SLPP)	party	swept	polls	among	the	Sinhala	majority	population	on	the	island.	The	SLPP	is
also	known	as	the	‘Rajapaksa	party’	–	after	the	founding	clan	that	currently	dominates	Sri	Lankan	politics,	best
known	for	having	overseen	the	end	of	the	decades-long	civil	war	on	the	island,	a	phase	characterised	by	numerous
atrocity	crimes	in	which	the	UN	estimates	over	70,000	Tamil	civilians	were	killed.
The	family	first	came	into	power	in	2005	with	the	election	of	Mahinda	Rajapaksa	as	president,	who	quickly
appointed	several	members	of	his	family	to	senior	positions	–	most	notorious	among	them,	Gotabaya	Rajapaksa,
who	served	as	Secretary	of	Defence	at	the	end	of	the	war.	They	ruled	on	a	platform	of	ardent	Sinhala	Buddhist
nationalism,	silencing	human	rights	defenders	and	crushing	dissent,	particularly	from	numerically	smaller	Tamil	and
Muslim	communities.
Even	after	the	armed	conflict	ended,	human	rights	violations	continued	with	an	endemic	culture	of	torture	and
disappearances.	Despite	numerous	UN	reports	cataloguing	the	gross	extent	of	their	violations,	the	Rajapaksas’
popularity	began	to	wane	in	the	south	of	the	country	only	as	allegations	of	corruption	and	economic	woes	were
beginning	to	be	felt	by	the	Sinhala	majority	that	brought	them	to	power.	In	2015,	as	Sinhala	frustration	grew	and
with	a	significant	Tamil	and	Muslim	turnout,	Mahinda	Rajapaksa	was	voted	out	of	office.
But	just	five	years	later,	his	brother	Gotabaya’s	ascendance	to	the	presidency	and	their	party’s	landslide	in	the
parliamentary	elections	are	a	reminder	that	the	dynamics	that	created	Sri	Lanka’s	cycles	of	violence	remain	firmly	in
play.
The	Fall
In	2015,	the	Rajapaksas	lost	both	the	presidential	and	parliamentary	elections	in	a	surprising	turn	that	saw	the	rise
of	a	coalition	of	parties	under	the	umbrella	of	‘Yahapalanaya’,	the	word	for	good	governance	in	Sinhala.	Importantly
though,	the	Rajapaksas	still	held	the	majority	of	the	vote	in	the	predominantly	Sinhala	south	–	an	often	overlooked
indicator	of	the	fragile	transition	that	had	happened.
Many	read	the	election	to	mean	the	country	was	finally	ready	to	meaningfully	deal	with	its	past.		At	first	it	seemed
like	this	hope	was	not	misplaced	as	the	newly	elected	Yahapalyana	government	co-sponsored	Resolution	30/1	at
the	UN	Human	Rights	Council,	committing	to	set	up	transitional	justice	mechanisms	including	a	hybrid	court.	Even
Tamil	victim-survivor	communities	on	the	island,	deeply	sceptical	after	decades	of	failed	government	mechanisms,
took	part	in	consultations	held	by	the	civil	society-led	Consultation	Task	Force	in	2016.
But	by	the	beginning	of	2017	it	was	clear	that	the	government	while	different	in	appearance,	had	not	changed	at	its
core,	and	that	Sinhala-Buddhist	nationalist	ideology	would	prevail.	Even	as	human	rights	NGOs	and	international
actors	swarmed	into	the	country,	holding	workshops	on	reconciliation,	senior	government	officials	continued	to
reassure	the	Sinhala	majority	that	they	would	never	allow	military	‘war	heroes’	to	be	prosecuted	under	war	crimes
charges,	and	refused	to	undertake	meaningful	security	sector	reform.
Tamil	victim-survivor	groups	quickly	recognising	the	duplicity	and	began	protesting	in	the	streets,	with	displaced
communities	and	families	of	the	disappeared	setting	up	continuous	roadside	protests	in	early	2017.	Last	week
marked	1,250	days	that	Tamil	families	of	the	disappeared	across	the	North-East	have	been	protesting	for	truth	and
justice	about	their	disappeared	loved	ones	–	many	of	whom	were	disappeared	at	the	end	of	the	war	under
Gotabaya’s	tenure	as	Secretary	of	Defence.
The	Revival
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The	Yahapalanaya	government’s	attempt	to	sell	Sinhala	nationalism	at	home	and	reconciliation	abroad	was
ultimately	a	futile	endeavour	because	no	one	in	its	ranks	could	do	‘Sinhala	nationalism’	quite	like	the	Rajapaksas
could.	Soon	after	their	shocking	loss	in	2015,	the	Rajapaksas	christened	a	new	political	party,	the	SLPP,	a	bold
move	in	a	traditionally	two-party	game	at	the	national	level.	They	began	effectively	spreading	the	message	that	the
Yahapalanaya	government	was	selling	out	the	Sinhala	nation	to	the	international	community,	both	politically	to	the
West,	and	economically	to	China	and	India.	Their	campaign	focused	on	a	populist	and	even	more	strident
nationalist	ideology,	courting	the	powerful	Sinhala-Buddhist	clergy	and	organising	a	powerful	ground	campaign	in
the	south	of	the	island.	The	allegations	of	corruption	surrounding	the	Rajapaksas	were	soon	forgotten	as	the	largest
part	of	the	Yahapalanaya	coalition,	the	United	National	Party	(UNP),	became	quickly	mired	in	scandal,
demonstrating	their	own	role	in	the	corruption	of	the	state.
In	2018,	as	cracks	began	to	widen	in	the	ruling	coalition,	the	Rajapaksas	swept	through	the	South	in	local	council
elections	and	then	even	attempted	a	constitutional	coup	with	then	President	Maithripala	Sirisena.	Though	the	coup
failed,	by	the	spring	of	2019	it	was	clear	that	the	Rajapaksas	were	going	to	be	an	indomitable	force.	The	tragic
Easter	Sunday	attacks	cast	a	light	on	the	Sri	Lankan	government’s	grave	security	failures,	and	made	the	imminent
return	to	office	of	the	‘strongmen’	Rajapaksas	all	but	inevitable	as	they	capitalised	on	the	politics	of	fear.
Last	week’s	parliamentary	election	gave	the	Rajapaksas	a	super-majority	–	achieved	only	a	few	times	in	Sri	Lanka’s
history.	Over	the	next	few	months	and	years,	there	will	be	many	analyses	and	explanations	of	the	election	results.
While	there	may	be	multiple	reasons	such	as	the	ineffectual	policies	and	campaigning	of	the	opposition,
widespread	economic	insecurities,	and	the	Easter	Sunday	attacks,	the	role	of	Sinhala	Buddhist	nationalism	as	a
root	cause	cannot	be	overstated.
Emerging	in	the	early	1900s,	this	ideology	has	been	the	bedrock	of	Sri	Lanka’s	multiple	cycles	of	violence,	and
centres	around	the	idea	of	Sri	Lanka	being	the	sole	bastion	of	Sinhala	Buddhism,	and	that	it	is	constantly	under
threat.	As	Stanley	Tambiah	wrote	in	1986,	the	Sinhala	population	is	a	“majority	with	a	minority	complex,”	a
description	that	endures.
This	nationalism	intersects	with	the	economic	insecurities	of	much	of	the	majority	community	to	permit	parties	like
the	Rajapaksas	to	sweep	in	claiming	to	be	the	protectors	of	the	‘Sinhala	nation’,	read	by	the	electorate	both	in
terms	of	livelihoods	and	religion/culture.	Unsurprisingly,	nationalism	was	not	an	issue	the	Yahapalanaya
government	chose	to	address,	even	in	their	half-hearted	steps	towards	reconciliation.
The	Fear
The	Rajapaksas	are	unashamedly	a	Sinhala-Buddhist	nationalist	political	machine	whose	policies	are	that	of
militarisation,	authoritarianism	and	centralisation.	While	some	may	argue	that	the	new	government	should	be	given
a	chance	before	receiving	criticism,	one	need	only	look	at	the	dire	consequences	suffered	already	by	vulnerable
communities	in	the	first	ten	months	of	Gotabaya’s	presidency.
Since	November,	Gotabaya	has	ushered	in	a	new	wave	of	clamping	down	on	human	rights	defenders,	journalists
and	lawyers,	particularly	from	Tamil	and	Muslim	communities.	The	Covid-19	pandemic	has	provided	ample	cover
for	the	promotion	of	accused	war	criminals	into	civilian	authorities	and	for	the	further	entrenchment	of	militarisation
across	the	North-East	of	the	island,	accomplished	with	ease	thanks	to	the	previous	government’s	failure	to
dismantle	or	reform	the	repressive	security	and	surveillance	structures.
Taking	a	page	out	of	neighbour	Narendra	Modi’s	book,	the	Sri	Lankan	government	earlier	this	year	began	to	go
after	non-profit	organisations	working	on	human	rights	via	their	finances,	and	Mahinda	Rajapaksa,	now	sworn	in	as
Prime	Minister,	vowed	during	election	campaigns	to	set	up	a	task	force	to	investigate	the	NGOs	that	have	been
criticising	the	government.	In	the	weeks	before	the	election,	the	Rajapaksas	set	up	an	all-Sinhalese	“Archaeology
Task	Force”	to	identify	for	preservation	‘heritage	sites’	in	the	historically	Tamil	and	Muslim	populated	Eastern
province	–	a	move	seen	to	be	an	attempt	to	further	Sinhala-Buddhist	colonisation	of	the	region.
The	parliamentary	election	has	only	guaranteed	Gotabaya	the	unchecked	power	to	continue	with	the	oppressive
and	chauvinistic	policies	he	has	reinvigorated.	As	celebrations	take	place	across	the	South	of	the	country
welcoming	back	the	Rajapaksas,	Tamil	and	Muslim	communities	on	the	island	have	already	begun	to	contemplate
their	survival.
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This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Photo:	Sri	Lanka	Mahinda	Rajapaksa.	Credit:	AK	Rockefeller,	Flickr,	Creative	Commons,	CC
BY-SA	2.0
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